Proving Causation in Toxic Tort Cases: T-Cell Studies as Epidemiological and Particularistic Evidence by Stundtner, Elizabeth A
Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review
Volume 20 | Issue 2 Article 6
12-1-1993
Proving Causation in Toxic Tort Cases: T-Cell
Studies as Epidemiological and Particularistic
Evidence
Elizabeth A. Stundtner
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/ealr
Part of the Environmental Law Commons, and the Torts Commons
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Boston College Environmental Affairs Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College
Law School. For more information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Elizabeth A. Stundtner, Proving Causation in Toxic Tort Cases: T-Cell Studies as Epidemiological and
Particularistic Evidence, 20 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 335 (1993), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/
ealr/vol20/iss2/6
PROVING CAUSATION IN TOXIC TORT CASES: 
T-CELL STUDIES AS EPIDEMIOLOGICAL AND 
PARTICULARISTIC EVIDENCE 
Elizabeth A. Stundtner* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The element of causation is difficult to establish in toxic tort cases 
because the concept of legal causation is much different than scien-
tific causation. 1 To find legal causation, a defendant must have 
breached a duty to the plaintiff that resulted in an injury to the 
plaintiff,2 while medical causation is the probability that the sus-
pected source did cause the plaintiff's injury.3 Because toxic torts 
can best be understood with the use of probabilistic evidence, at 
present, courts generally rely upon epidemiological evidence as well 
as particularistic evidence to establish causation in toxic tort cases.4 
Epidemiological evidence represents one of the most promising 
scientific methods in toxic tort causation analysis.5 An epidemiolog-
ical study assesses whether a relationship exists between a single 
factor in a partiCUlar environment and the presence of a particular 
disease within that environment's population. 6 There are limitations, 
• Managing Editor, 1992-1993, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
1 See Christopher Callahan, Establishment of Causation in Toxic Tort Litigation, 23 ARIz. 
ST. L.J. 605, 618 (1991); Troyen Brennan, Causal Chains and Statistical Links: The Role of 
Scientijic Uncertainty in Hazardous-Substance Litigation, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 467, 470 
(1988). 
2 See W. KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 263 (5th 
ed. 1984). 
3 See Brennan, supra note 1, at 475. 
• See, e.g., Elam v. Alcolac, Inc., 765 S.W.2d 42,178,185 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988), cm. denied, 
493 U.S. 817 (1989). 
6 Otto Wong, Using Epidemiology to Determine Causation in Disease, 3 NAT. RESOURCES 
AND THE ENV'T 20, 20-21 (Spring 1988). Although epidemiology as a scientific discipline is 
still in a fonnative stage of development, it has become a frequently used method for proving 
causality in toxic torts. I d. 
6 Bert Black & David Lilienfeld, Epidemiologic Proof in Toxic Tort Litigation, 52 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 732, 750-51 (1984). 
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however, to using epidemiological evidence to prove causation.7 The 
most difficult problem is that an epidemiological study can never 
prove causation with regard to a single individual; it can only provide 
an estimate of risk for a given population. 8 
Particularistic evidence is another method litigants use in pre-
senting evidence regarding causation. 9 In contrast to probabilistic 
evidence, particularistic evidence deals only with that specific plain-
tiff.lO A doctor can provide particularistic evidence by diagnosing a 
specific injury in a plaintiff and subsequently testifying as an expert 
that the defendant's conduct caused the plaintiff's injury.ll Particu-
laristic evidence, however, also poses problems in proving legal cau-
sation. 12 For example, because the etiology13 of many diseases is 
unknown, courts carefully scrutinize the scientific foundation of the 
conclusions of the treating physician/expert witness. 14 
Although there are a number of scientific means available to de-
velop both epidemiological and particularistic evidence in toxic tort 
cases, one of the most promising means is the T-cell study.15 T-cells 
are one of the components of the immune system which protect the 
body from foreign matter. 16 An epidemiological T-cell study can show 
a strong correlation between a disease and its cause within a specific 
population. 17 In addition, by analyzing T-cells for particularistic ev-
idence, physicians can evaluate the status and strength of an indi-
vidual's immune system: an assessment that determines whether a 
toxic substance has damaged it. 18 
Although epidemiological evidence and particularistic evidence 
alone have limitations in proving causation, this Comment argues 
that the use of T-cell studies in toxic tort cases can produce both 
7 See Edward Dangel, Proof of Causation in Toxic Torts, 74 MASS. L. REV. 169, 178 (1989). 
8 See Nancy Lee Firak, The Developing Policy Characteristics of Cause-in-Fact: Alternative 
Forms of Liability, Epidemiological Proof and Trans-Scientific Issues, 63 TEMP. L. REV. 
311, 329-30 (1990). 
9 Callahan, supra note 1, at 619. 
10 See id. 
11 Id. 
12Id. at 630-40. 
13 DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 587 (27th ed. 1988). Etiology is defined 
as U[t]he study or theory of the factors that cause disease and the method of their introduction 
to the host; the cause(s} or origin of a disease or disorder." Id. 
14 Callahan, supra note 1, at 630-31. 
16 See Alan Levin & Vera Byers, Environmental Illness: A Disorder of Immune Regulation, 
2 OCCUPATIONAL MED. 669, 676 (1987). 
16 Philippa Marrack & John Kappler, The T-Cell and Its Receptor, 254 SCI. AM. 36, 36-37 
(Feb. 1986). 
17 See R. Baldwin & V. Byers, Immunological Aspects of Cancer Etiology 1, 5 (1991) 
(unpublished article on file with V. Beyers). 
18 Levin & Byers, supra note 15, at 671-72. 
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epidemiological and particularistic evidence, and thereby overcome 
the limitations of only one kind of evidence. More specifically, T-cell 
studies are a valuable method of assessing correlations between the 
incidence of an injury or disease and the presence of a toxic substance 
within a given population. Furthermore, an individual T-cell study 
can provide specific evidence concerning the injury and its cause for 
an individual plaintiff. Section II of this Comment considers the 
difference between scientific and legal causation and the role of 
epidemiolgical and particularistic evidence in meeting the demands 
of legal causation. 19 Section III reviews T -cells' function in the im-
mune system, how "clinical ecology" has developed T-cell studies, 
and how the legal system has used them.20 Section IV examines how 
courts use epidemiological evidence to prove causation in toxic tort 
cases. 21 In addition, this section discusses what epidemiology is and 
the value and limits of epidemiological evidence. 22 In Section V, this 
Comment examines how courts use particularistic evidence to prove 
causation in toxic tort cases. 23 This section also discusses what par-
ticularistic evidence is, as well as the value and limits of particular-
istic evidence. 24 Section VI examines how courts use both particu-
laristic evidence and epidemiological evidence to determine 
causation. 25 Finally, Section VII reviews the value of T-cell studies 
in present and future toxic tort litigation. 26 
Because particularistic evidence and epidemiological evidence each 
present limitations in proving or disproving causation, both types of 
evidence are important to determine legal causation. This Comment 
concludes that T-cell studies are an innovative scientific method that 
litigants should consider and develop as a new means of providing a 
basis for both kinds of evidence in toxic tort cases. 
II. LEGAL CAUSATION IN TOXIC TORTS AND THE USE OF 
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE TO PROVE CAUSATION 
Legal causation is usually difficult to establish in toxic tort litiga-
tion. 27 To prove legal causation, a plaintiff must prove that the 
19 See infra notes 27-62 and accompanying text. 
20 See infra notes 63-109 and accompanying text. 
21 See infra notes 110-11, 146-66 and accompanying text. 
22 See infra notes 112-45 and accompanying text. 
23 See infra notes 167-69, 186-223 and accompanying text. 
24 See infra notes 170-85 and accompanying text. 
25 See infra notes 224-308 and accompanying text. 
26 See infra notes 309-74 and accompanying text. 
27 Brennan, supra note 1, at 478; see also, In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. 
Supp. 740, 842 (E.D.N. Y. 1984), afl'd, 818 F.2d 145 (2d eir. 1987). 
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defendant breached a duty to the plaintiff and that this breach led 
directly to the plaintiff's injury.28 In toxic tort litigation, the plaintiff 
must prove that the toxic substance was both the cause-in-fact and 
the proximate cause of the plaintiff's disease.29 A plaintiff establishes 
cause-in-fact by proving that without the defendant's act, the injury 
would not have occurred.30 To establish proximate cause, which is a 
policy judgment, the plaintiff must show that the defendant's breach 
of duty was so closely connected to the plaintiff's injury that a court 
should invoke liability.31 Although courts generally do not rely on 
this concept, another legal term of causation is "causal tendency."32 
Causal tendency is a finding that the defendant's breach of duty 
increased the risk that the plaintiff would incur an injury. 33 
Courts require the plaintiff to establish by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the toxic substance was the cause of his or her injury. 34 
This means that the plaintiff must prove that the defendant more 
likely than not caused the plaintiff's injury.35 Traditionally, courts 
have derived a decision on whether causation exists from particular 
facts and evidence through the process of deduction. 36 
Plaintiffs in toxic tort cases, however, face a difficult task in at-
tempting to prove that a particular toxic substance caused their 
particular injury.37 The etiology of many diseases is unknown and 
hazardous substance illnesses often lack a physical trauma that 
marks their onset.38 Factors other than the toxic substance may be 
the actual cause of the disease.39 This is the indeterminancy prob-
lem.40 There are two facets to the indeterminancy problem, one 
involving the defendant and one involving the plaintiff.41 First, a 
28 See W. KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, at 263. 
29 See id. at 263-64. 
30 I d. at 265. 
311d. at 264; see Firak, supra note 8, at 311. 
32 Mario Rizzo, Forewarn: Fundamentals of Causation, 63 CHICAGO KENT L. REV. 397, 
403-04 (1987). Mr. Rizzo uses the term "probabilistic causation." Id. at 403. 
33 Id. at 405. 
34 W. KEEToN ET AL., supra note 2, at 263. 
35 Id. 
36 Troyen Brennan, Untangling Causation Issues in Law and Medicine: Hazardous Sub-
stance Litigation, 107 ANNALS OF INTERNAL MED. 741, 743 (1987). 
37 Callahan, supra note 1, 616-17. 
38 Id. at 617. 
39 Joshua Muscat & Michael Huncharek, Causation and Disease: Biomedical Science in 
Toxic Tort Litigation, 31 J. OF OCCUPATIONAL MED. 997, 997 (1989). 
40 Callahan, supra note 1, at 612-18; Firak, supra note 8, at 316. 
41 Callahan, supra note 1, at 612, 616. 
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plaintiff may be unable to determine who the defendant is.42 If the 
plaintiff was exposed to more than one toxin, he or she must establish 
which toxin caused his or her illness. 43 Second, the plaintiff must 
show that exposure to the toxin was the direct cause of the injury.44 
Accordingly, the traditional legal standard of causation, which re-
quires direct proof linking the defendant to the plaintiff, can rarely 
be met in toxic tort cases. 45 
The legal standard of causation, however, is much different than 
the standard of scientific causation. 46 Scientific evidence merely dem-
onstrates a probability that a given chemical caused a particular 
individual's disease. 47 Using inductive reasoning, scientists attempt 
to determine causation through the process of hypothesis building. 48 
Scientists then test the generated hypothesis repeatedly to establish 
a statistic or probability.49 Epidemiological studies, for example, can 
establish strong correlations between exposure to a chemical and 
the occurrence of disease within a certain population. 50 
Because it is difficult for toxic tort plaintiffs to meet the legal 
causation standard with scientific evidence, some courts have relaxed 
the strict legal standard of causation. 51 Some courts have more lib-
erally construed the Federal Rules of Evidence to allow statistical 
evidence and novel medical evidence. 52 The courts, however, have 
42 See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig. 597 F. Supp. 740, 816-17 (E.D.N. Y. 1984), 
aff'd, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987); Developments in the Law-Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 
HARV. L. REV. 1458, 1624-25 (1986) [hereinafter Developments]. 
43 Callahan, supra note 1, at 612. 
44 Id. at 616-17. 
45 See generally, Developments, supra note 42, at 1624-25. 
46 Brennan, supra note 1, 478-83. Troyen Brennan explains that the history of legal cau-
sation developed from corpuscularian science, which defined causation as impacts that follow 
from the physical laws of mathematics and Newton's concepts of physics. Id. at 478. Scientific 
causation, however, derives from the development of quantum mechanics and the theory of 
relativity. I d. 
47 See Brennan, supra note 1, at 475. Because the etiology of cancer is still unknown to a 
great extent, one cannot prove that a specific carcinogen caused a specific individual's cancer. 
Id. 
48 I d. at 481. 
49Id. at 482-83. 
50 Grant Foster, A Case Study in Toxic Tort Causation: Scientific and Legal Standards 
Work against Recovery for Victims, 19 ENVTL. L. 141, 162 (1988). 
51 Michael Dore, A Commentary on the Use of Epidemiological Evidence in Demonstrating 
Cause-in-Fact, 7 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 429, 430 (1983). 
52 Id. at 430, citing, Miller v. Nat'l Cabinet Co. 168 N.E.2d 811,813 (N.Y. 1960); Anderson 
v. W.R. Grace & Co, 628 F. Supp. 1219, 1225-26 (D. Mass. 1983), aff'd sub nom. Anderson 
v. Beatrice Foods Co., 900 F.2d 388 (1st Cir. Mass.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 233 (1990). 
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not agreed upon a unified interpretation of rules such as FRE 403,53 
702,54 or 70355 concerning the admission of scientific evidence. 56 
Another method by which courts have lessened plaintiffs' burden 
of proving legal causation is the application of the substantial factor 
test. 57 With this test, a court would find a defendant liable if he or 
she contributed to a great extent to the harmful result, even if the 
harm may have occurred without the defendant's actions. 58 Thus, 
the court would find liability even if the evidence only showed that 
the defendant significantly increased the risk that the plaintiff would 
suffer an injury. 59 
Finally, some courts have allowed the use of a "weak" version of 
the preponderance rule.60 This standard allows plaintiffs to prove 
through statistical proof that the defendant more likely than not 
caused the plaintiff's injury.61 Because these new causation stan-
dards are so novel, however, courts have not utilized them on a wide 
basis. Thus, courts still expect plaintiffs to present causation evi-
dence that meets the conventional standard of legal causation. 62 
53 FED. R. EVID. 403 states that, "although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of 
the issues or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence." 
54 FED. R. EVID. 702 states that, "if scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge 
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness 
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify 
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." 
55 FED. R. EVID. 703 states that, "the facts or data in the particular case upon which an 
expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert 
at or before the hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field 
in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible 
in evidence." 
56 See Anne Toker, Admitting Scientific Evidence in Toxic Tort Litigation, 15 HARV. ENVTL. 
L. REV. 165, 166, 178 (1991). 
67 See, e.g., Elam v. Alcolac, Inc., 765 S.W.2d 42, 174 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988), cert. denied, 
493 U.S. 817 (1989). 
68 I d. at 173-74. The court determined that the substantial factor test "is particularly suited 
to injury from chronic exposure to toxic chemicals where the sequent manifestation of biological 
disease may be the result of a confluence of cases." I d. at 174. 
69 Id. at 174. 
60 Callahan, supra note 1, at 611. 
61 Id.; Developments, supra note 42, at 1619. 
62 See Callahan, supra note 1, at 611; Parker v. Employers Mutual Liab. Ins. Co., 440 
S. W.2d 43, 47 (Tex. 1969) (court required that plaintiff prove his cancer was "more likely than 
not" caused by his exposure to radiation), construed in Black & Lilienfeld, supra, note 6, at 
749. 
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III. THE FUNCTION OF T -CELLS AND THE 
USE OF T-CELL STUDIES 
A. T-Cells and Their Function 
The T-cell study is one epidemiological study or patient exam that 
plaintiffs or defendants can use to prove or disprove legal causation 
in toxic tort cases. T -cells are an important component of the immune 
system.63 When an "antigen"64 enters the body, the immune system 
has one of two immune responses. 65 A "humoral immunity" response 
mobilizes specific antibodies,66 which B-cells produce; a "cellular im-
munity" response mobilizes certain types of white cells, the T -lym-
phocyte series, T -cells. 67 On the outside of the T-cell is a protein 
called the "T-cell receptor."68 Each T-cell has a specific T-cell recep-
tor that binds to a specific type of antigen, similar to a key that fits 
into a lock. 69 Once the receptor has attached itself to an antigen 
(which may be within a cell), the T-cell can reproduce to destroy the 
antigen. 70 
There are four types of T-cells: "cyto-toxic" T-cells, "helper" T-
cells, "suppressor" T-cells, and "memory" T-cells. Cyto-toxic T-cells 
fight against viral infections and other antigens, such as cancerous 
tumors.71 Cyto-toxic T -cells are activated when an antigen bearing 
cell is covered with major histocompatibility complex (MHC) 
molecules72 and antigen peptides lock with the T -cell's receptor. 73 
Once the T-cell recognizes the antigen-bearing cell as unhealthy and 
is then mobilized into a mature T-cell, the cyto-toxic T-cell will 
reproduce and destroy the unhealthy cell by secreting enzymes. 74 
63 See Marrack & Kappler, supra note 16, at 36. 
64 AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 115 (2d ed. 1985). The definition of antigen is "a 
substance that when introduced into the body stimulates the production of an antibody." Id. 
66 S. SELL, IMMUNOLOGY, IMMUNOPATHOLOGY, AND IMMUNITY 6 (4th ed. 1987). 
66 THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 114 (2d ed. 1985). The definition of antibody is 
"any of various proteins in the blood that are generated in reaction to foreign proteins or 
polysaccharides, neutralize them, and thus produce immunity against certain microorganisms 
or their toxins." Id. 
67Id. 
68 Marrack & Kappler, supra note 16, at 36. 
69 Harald von Bohmer & Pawel Kisielow, How the Immune System Learns about the Self, 
265 SCI. AM. 74, 74 (Oct. 1991); Marrack & Kappler, supra note 16, at 36. 
70 von Boehmer & Kisielow, supra note 69, at 75-77. 
71 Id. at 74. 
72 Id. at 75. MHC molecules carry antigen peptides from within the cell to the surface of 
the cell. I d. 
73 Id. at 74-75. 
7. Id. 
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Helper T-cells assist B-cells (humoral immunity) in producing an-
tibodies to fight toxic bacteria, a type of antigen. 75 Mobilized helper 
T -cells produce interleukins, which incite B-cells to multiply and send 
more antibodies into the bloodstream to bind to a toxin and deacti-
vate it.76 Suppressor T -cells inhibit an immune response by depress-
ing the reaction of the helper T-cell and B-cell immune response. 77 
Finally, memory T-cells, as well as some B-cells, "remember" a 
first antigen attack. 78 A subsequent attack by an antigen activates 
the memory cells more quickly which results in a more significant 
antibody production and a stronger binding action by the T -cells. 79 
B. The Scientific Use of T-Cell Studies 
Scientists use studies of T-cells, otherwise known as immune pro-
files, to show abnormalities in the immune system.80 T-cell studies 
arose in the context of the recently developed medical discipline of 
clinical ecology.81 Clinical ecology focuses on human chemical hyper-
sensitivity syndrome, also known as multiple chemical sensitivities 
(MCS).82 MCS is a disorder involving chronically repeating symp-
toms that relate to many of the various organ systems and are a 
response to low-dose chemical exposure.83 Clinical ecology, however, 
has yet to understand clearly the etiology and resulting symptoms 
of MCS.84 One theory of the immunopathogenesis85 of MCS is that 
75Id. at 76. 
76Id. 
77 Brian McClain, Meet the T-Cell Antigen Receptor, 52 THE AM. BIOLOGY TEACHER 276, 
276 (May 1990). 
78 SELL, supra note 65, at 217-18. 
79 Id. at 218. 
80 See Levin & Byers, supra note 15, at 676. 
81 Abba Terr, "Multiple Chemical Sensitivities": Immunologic Critique of Clinical Ecology 
Theories and Practice, 2 OCCUPATIONAL MED. 683, 691 (1987). 
82 Troyen Brennan, Helping Courts with Toxic Torts: Some Proposals Regarding Alterna-
tive Methods for Presenting and Assessing Scientific Evidence in Common Law Courts, 51 
U. PIT!'. L. REV. 1, 59 (1989); Terr, supra note 81, at 684. Multiple Chemical Sensitivities 
has many synonyms, including environmental illness, chemically induced immune dysregula-
tion, and twentieth century disease. Id. at 684. 
83 Mark Cullen, The Worker with Multiple Chemical Sensitivities: An Overview, 2 Occu-
PATIONAL MED. 655, 657 (1987). 
84 See Terr, supra note 81, at 690. Once clinical ecologists better understand the etiology 
and symptoms of MCS, they can attempt to more clearly define, diagnose, and treat MCS. 
See id. at 684-88. 
85 DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DICTIONARY 823 (27th ed. 1988). Immunopathoge-
nesis is defined as, "a process in which the course of a disease is altered or affected by an 
immune response (either the cellular[T-cell] or humoral [B-cell] response) or by the products 
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toxins cause damage to the T -cells, which results in a damaged 
immune system.86 Clinical ecologists therefore perform T-cell studies 
to determine the presence of such toxin damage. 87 
There are several types of T-cell studies.88 AT-cell study can 
calculate the absolute levels of each T-cell population or also deter-
mine the balance between the different populations in the form of 
ratios. 89 Another type of T-cell study can measure the speed of the 
memory T -cells by exposing a sample of these cells to a small bit of 
an antigen in order to determine whether they were previously 
exposed to that particular type of antigen. 90 Yet another type of T-
cell measurement is the "mitogen challenge. "91 A researcher with-
draws a T-cell sample from a patient's blood and measures its energy 
per minute. 92 The researcher then exposes the T-cells to an antigen 
to determine whether the lymphocytes' energy level increases.93 If 
the T-cells fail to react quickly, this is an indication that the T-cells 
have been suppressed or damaged.94 
People with a healthy immune system have absolute T-cell num-
bers, reaction rates, and ratios that fall within a normal range.95 If 
a person is exposed to a chemical for an extended period of time, 
however, his or her T-cell numbers and ratios become skewed, in-
dicating immune dysregulation.96 If an entire population of people 
suffer from T-cell abnormalities, an epidemiologist would examine 
the population to find a common factor that would indicate the cause 
of these abnormalities. 97 For example, epidemiological studies show 
a significant increase in suppressor cells and/or a decrease in the 
of an immune reaction, such as the antigen-antibody-complement complexes deposited in renal 
glomeruli." ld. 
86 ld. at 69l. 
87 See generally id. 
88 See Alan Levin & Vera Byers, Multiple Chemical Sensitivities: A Practicing Clinician's 
Point of View: Clinical and Immunologic Research Findings, 8 (1991) (unpublished article 
on file with the authors). 
89 ld. 
!IO Telephone Interview with Dr. Alan S. Levin, clinical ecologist and immunologist (Nov. 
13, 1991); see generally SELL, supra note 65, at 218 (in depth and technical discussion of 
process). 
91 Elam v. Alcolac, 765 S.W.2d 42,99 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 817 (1989). 
92 ld. 
93 ld. 
94 ld. 
96 Dr. Levin's Supplementary Affidavit, cited in, Jan Schlictmann, Eight Families Sue W.R. 
Grace and Beatrice Foods for Poisoning City Wells with Solvents and Causing Leukemia, 
Disease, and Death, 341 PRACTISING LAW INST. 1,44 (1987). 
96 ld. 
97 Levin & Byers, supra note 15, at 673-74. 
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helper/suppressor cell ratio in cohort populations that have been 
exposed to formaldehyde. 98 Thus, T-cell studies could show a causal 
link between exposure to a chemical and the presence of an illness 
that was in the past more difficult to prove. 99 
C. The Use of T-Cell Studies in Toxic Tort Litigation 
Litigants have used T-cell studies to show causation for cancer, 100 
chemically induced immune dysregulation,lOl emotional distress, 102 
and increased risk of disease.103 In litigation, a plaintiff using a T-
cell study as evidence essentially argues that exposure to a particular 
chemical caused the injury or serious abnormality in the immune 
system. 104 Because T-cell studies were recently developed, litigants 
have not used them to prove causation in toxic torts on a widespread 
basis. A number of scientists and doctors do not yet accept clinical 
ecology, the basis of T-cell studies, as a scientific discipline. 105 Fur-
thermore, judges and juries have difficulty understanding the intri-
cacies of T-cell studies and what the results of T-cell studies actually 
mean. 106 
Despite the difficulties in understanding the biology of T -cells, T-
cell studies are basically a means to measure the health of the 
immune system.107 A researcher can test the T -cells of an individual 
98 Levin & Byers, supra note 88, at 8. 
99 See generally Levin & Byers, supra note 15, 673-74. 
100 Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1219, 1225 (D. Mass. 1986), a/I'd sub nom. 
Anderson v. Beatrice Foods Co., 900 F.2d 388 (1st Cir. Mass.), eert. denied, III S. Ct. 233 
(1990). 
101 Elam v. Alcolac, Inc., 765 S.W.2d 42, 189-90 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988), eert. denied, 493 U.S. 
817 (1989). 
102 Anderson, 628 F. Supp. at 1226. 
103 [d. at 1231. 
104 See, e.g., Sterling v. Velsicol Chern. Corp., 647 F. Supp. 303, 501-05 (W.D. Tenn. 1986), 
aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988); Anderson, 628 F. Supp. at 1225. 
105 Brennan, supra note 82, at 61 n.268. The American Acadamy of Allergists does not 
accept the scientific basis of clinical ecology. [d. 
106 See Sterling, 855 F.2d at 1188 (court rejected T-cell study because it was not traditional 
clinical test); Compare Telephone Interview with Dr. Alan S. Levin, clinical ecologist and 
immunologist (October 15, 1991), discussing, Tiderman v. Fleetwood Homes of Washington, 
670 P.2d 685 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983), rev'd, 684 P.2d 1302 (Wash. 1984). In this case, the 
plaintiff's expert performed a memory T-cell test to determine whether the plaintiff had been 
exposed previously to formaldehyde. [d. Although, the test showed previous exposure and 
the trial court found the defendant liable, the Washington Court of Appeals did not find the 
evidence persuasive. [d. The Supreme Court of Washington held that the plaintiff's evidence 
was persuasive and thus reversed the Court of Appeals decision. See Tiderman, 684 P.2d at 
1304. 
107 See Levin & Byers, supra note 15, at 676. 
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in a number of ways.108 If a researcher decides to study the T -cells 
of a population of people, that may be the beginning of a epidemio-
logical study. 109 
IV. THE USE OF EPIDEMIOLOGICAL EVIDENCE TO PROVE 
CAUSATION IN TOXIC TORTS 
Although most courts still require plaintiffs to meet the strong 
version of the preponderance rule to prove causation, many courts 
do regard highly epidemiological studies that show strong causal 
associations between chemical exposure and disease. 110 If an epide-
miological study shows a significant statistical association between 
an injury and a toxin, and the study was conducted in a manner that 
follows accepted scientific criteria, it can be strong evidence of a 
causal association between the plaintiff's injury and the defendant's 
conduct. 111 
A. Epidemiology as a Science 
Epidemiology is the study of the dispersion of disease occurrence 
within and among human popUlations and the determination of the 
possible causes through the use of statistics. 112 Using a chosen human 
population,113 an epidemiological study can generate evidence that 
demonstrates whether a probabilistic correlation exists between the 
defendant's action and the plaintiff's injury.114 An epidemiological 
study is the only study that can quantify the magnitude of the studied 
correlation in humans. 115 
Although many believe that epidemiological studies are often the 
best way of determining health risks that a toxin may pose to human 
health, epidemiology is not a perfect science. The diseases usually 
involved in toxic torts can be characterized by long latency periods, 
108 See Levin & Byers, supra note 88, at 8; Elam v. Alcolac, 765 S.W.2d 42, 99 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 817 (1989); Sell, supra note 65, at 218. 
109 See generally CHARLES HENNEKENS & JULIE BURING, EPIDEMIOLOGY IN MEDICINE 
30--53 (1987). 
110 See Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1115 (5th Cir. 1991); In re 
Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 768 F. Supp. 199,203 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), rev'd, 964 F.2d 
92 (2d Cir. 1992). 
111 Otto Wong, Epidemiology: Proving Cause in Chronic Cases, 126 N.J.L.J. 85, 85 (1990). 
112 See Firak, supra note 8, at 328; HENNEKENS & BURING, supra note 109, at 3. 
113 HENNEKENS & BURING, supra note 109, at 12. 
114 Firak, supra note 8, at 330. 
115 HENNEKENS & BURING, supra note 109, at 13. To know the magnitude of the association 
is helpful to determine the probability that the exposure itself affects the risk of acquiring 
the disease which therefore shows the probability of causation in a particular case. Id. at 39. 
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uncertain causes and etiology, and the fact that a chemically caused 
disease is indistinguishable from a disease caused by something 
else. 116 Furthermore, an epidemiological study can never show con-
clusively that an individual's exposure to a chemical caused a partic-
ular injury. 117 
Because epidemiological studies rely on human populations, re-
searchers cannot exercise the same degree of control that they do 
in the laboratory.lls In order to ensure the validity of a study's 
statistical results, researchers must control the elements of chance, 
bias in subject selection or manner of study, and confounding. 119 An 
epidemiologist also must determine whether the results of the study 
apply generally beyond the population studied. 120 As a result, valid 
and reliable epidemiological correlations are difficult to establish. 121 
Indeed, even if an epidemiologist discovers a valid and significant 
statistical association, that does not necessarily indicate a causal 
association. 122 Strict criteria exist that epidemiologists follow in or-
der to establish causation in an epidemiological study.123 First, the 
strength and significance of association is a ratio measure between 
a control group and a group exposed; the higher the ratio, the more 
significant the relationship between the factor and the disease. 124 
Second, findings by separate researchers using different study de-
signs and under different circumstances should show a consistency 
of association. 125 
A third criterion is specificity.126 Specificity requires a showing 
that a certain type of exposure is associated with a certain type of 
disease. 127 Because some diseases, however, may have many possible 
116 Wong, supra note 111, at 85. 
117 Dangel, supra note 7, at 178. _ 
118 See HENNEKENS & BURING, supra note 109, at 31 (scientists cannot perfonn direct 
experiments on humans). 
119 See id. Counfounding occurs when a correlation, or lack of correlation, between an injury 
and disease is not causal, but rather, a third factor that is related to the exposure is causing 
the injury. See id. at 3~6. An example of this problem is that studies of asbestos workers 
who later become ill with cancer may be confounded by the possible factor that asbestos 
workers tend to smoke more than the average individual. 
120 Id. at 37. 
121 Id. at 50. 
122 Id. 
123 A.B. Hill, The Environment and Disease: Association with CausatiC'n, 58 PROC. OF THE 
ROYAL SOC'Y OF MED. 295 (1965), noted in Wong, supra note 5, at 2l. 
124 Id. at 21-22; see supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
126 Hill, supra note 122, at 22. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
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causes, specificity is not a strict requirement. 128 Fourth, a researcher 
must show temporality.l29 Temporality refers to the determination 
that the exposure to the possible cause of disease came before the 
onset of the disease. 13o A fifth criterion is the dose-response rela-
tionship, which is a comparison of the strength of the exposure and 
the severity of disease response. 131 If the severity of the disease 
increases with the amount of exposure, a strong dose-response re-
lationship exists. l32 The final guideline is biological plausiblity.l33 If 
the causal relationship between exposure and disease is consistent 
with present scientific knowledge, the argument for causation is 
stronger. 134 
Once the epidemiological study is completed, an epidemiologist 
calculates the "attributable risk" to measure the causal relationship 
between an exposure and a specific individual. 135 The attributable 
risk is a measure of association, quantifying the probability that the 
studied exposure did cause the exposed group's disease as compared 
to some other cause. 136 To calculate the attributable risk, the epi-
demiologist first determines the relative risk of the population. 137 
The "relative risk" measures the probability of an individual in the 
exposed group becoming ill as compared to an individual in the 
non exposed groUp.l38 An epidemiologist calculates this number by 
dividing the disease incidence in the exposed group of people in the 
study over the disease incidence in the non-exposed group of peo-
ple. 139 The relative risk number is needed in order to calculate the 
attributable risk. 140 Epidemiologists contend that if the attributable 
risk is greater than fifty percent, that calculation meets the more-
likely-than-not standard of causation. 141 
128 [d. 
129 [d. 
130 See id. at 49. 
131 [d. 
132 [d. 
133 [d. 
134 [d. 
135 [d. at 50. 
136 HENNEKENS & BURING, supra note 109, at 87. 
137 Wong, supra note 5, at 49. 
138 HENNEKENS & BURING, supra note 109, at 77. 
139 Junius McElveen & Pamela Eddy, Cancer and Toxic Substances: The Problem of Cau-
sation and the Use of Epidemiology, 33 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 29, 43 (1984-85). The relative 
risk formula is: RR = risk in the exposed population/risk in the nonexposed population. [d. 
140 Wong, supra note 5, at 50. Attributable risk is calculated as: AR = P(RR - l)/(P(RR -
1) + 1). [d. "P" equals the proportion exposed in the study group and "P" equals one when 
the entire group is exposed. [d. 
141 See id. 
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Consequently, although epidemiological studies can offer strong 
evidence of levels of risk in a population due to a certain cause, such 
studies at the most can show only that risk of disease. 142 Epidemio-
logical studies can never establish the cause of the disease in a 
specific individual. 143 Furthermore, in attempting to produce valid 
studies, epidemiologists must be extremely careful to limit the prob-
lems of chance, confounding, and bias. 144 Finally, to show a causal 
association, epidemiologists must follow several criteria that are 
difficult to meet. 145 
B. The Courts' Analysis of Epidemiological Evidence 
In toxic tort cases, some courts regard epidemiological studies as 
the only relevant evidence to prove causation. 146 Even when it is 
available, particularistic evidence concerning a plaintiff may not have 
the same value to the court as studies that show an increased risk 
across a population. 147 Thus, because epidemiological studies may 
appeal more to judges and juries than testimony of a physician's 
examination in the toxic tort context, some plaintiffs need epidemi-
ological evidence in order to prevail. 148 
In a number of recent cases, courts have carefully analyzed and 
understood epidemiological evidence. 149 For example, In re Joint 
142 Dore, supra note 51, at 433. 
143 See supra note 117 and accompanying text. 
144 See supra notes 105-08 and accompanying text. 
145 See supra notes 109-21 and accompanying text; see generally HENNEKENS & BURING, 
supra note 59, at 31, 39. 
146 See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig. 597 F. Supp. 740, 836 (E.D.N.Y. 
1984), aJJ'd, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987). In the case the District Court for the Eastern District 
of New York decided to use the weak version of the preponderance rule, which only requires 
statistical evidence to prove causation. I d. The court reasoned that it is difficult, if not 
impossible, for plaintiffs to provide particularistic evidence, and that any particularistic evi-
dence is based on probabilities. Id. 
147 See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1239 (E.D.N.Y. 
1985), aJJ'd, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987). 
148 Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Chern. Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1115-16 (5th Cir. 1991) 
(although plaintiff did not offer epidemiological evidence, court noted that even plaintiff's 
expert believed that epidemiological evidence is important to establish causation); Heyman v. 
United States, 506 F. Supp. 1145, 1149 (S.D. Fla. 1981) (court denied plaintiff relief because 
she did not produce epidemiological evidence to show causation). 
149 In a few older cases, courts understood the value and the limits of epidemiological 
evidence, admitted it as evidence, and cautiously analyzed its worth. See, e.g., Miller v. Nat'l 
Cabinet Co., 168 N.E.2d 811,813-14 (N.Y. 1960) (court acknowledged that epidemiological, 
or statistical, evidence had value in proving causation). This trend has continued. See Brennan, 
supra note 1, at 494 n.127 (citing Oxendinge v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 506 A.2d 
1100 (D.C. Cir. 1986)). The District of Columbia Circuit Court closely examined the four 
principle methods for identifying toxicity and causation-cluster analyses, animal bioassays, 
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Eastern and Southern District Asbestos Litigation,15O the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of N ew York consid-
ered the importance of relative risk ratios in studying the plaintiff's 
epidemiological studies to prove causation and granted the defen-
dants' motion to dismiss because the plaintiff could not show that 
her husband's exposure to asbestos gave him twice the normal risk 
of developing cancer. 151 Reversing the District Court's decision, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the 
plaintiff did not need to provide a certain level of epidemiological 
proof to defeat summary judgment because the plaintiff also pro-
vided particularistic evidence. 152 The Court of Appeals, however, 
still expected a plaintiff to present some epidemiological evidence to 
prove causation. 153 
In a case in which the defendants offered strong epidmiological 
evidence to the court, a group of plaintiffs lost a motion for summary 
judgment in the case, In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Liti-
gation. l54 Claiming that exposure to the herbicide Agent Orange 
caused their health problems, the plaintiffs, Vietnam veterans, sued 
seven Agent Orange manufacturers. 155 The United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of N ew York began its discussion of 
the worthiness of epidemiological evidence with the statement that 
those epidemiological studies concerning the link between exposure 
and disease to Agent Orange were the only useful studies having 
any bearing on causation. 156 The court found that all the available 
epidemiological evidence showed no causal link between Agent Or-
ange and the illnesses of the Vietnam veterans. 157 Therefore, ac-
cording to the court, the plaintiffs could not offer expert testimony 
because there was no strong epidemiological evidence on which to 
short-term molecular assays, and epidemiological studies. Id. The court also reviewed the 
expert testimony dealing with epidemiological evidence, the importance of relative risk ratios, 
and the statistical significance of confidence intervals, to decide that the plaintiff's evidence 
did establish a causal link between birth defects and benedictin. Id. 
150 758 F. Supp. 199 (S.D.N. Y. 1991), rev'd, 964 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1992). 
151 Id. at 202-03. 
152 In re Joint Eastern, 964 F.2d at 97. 
153 See id. 
154 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1231~2 (D.C.N. Y. 1985), afI'd, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987). 
155 I d. at 1228. 
156 Id. at 1231. The court stated that "[i]n a mass tort case such as Agent Orange, epide-
miologic studies on causation assume a role of critical importance." Id. at 1239. 
157Id. at 1231~4. The court cited two epidemiological studies that showed no causal link 
between Agent Orange exposure and harmful reproductive effects. Id. at 1231~2. Other 
epidemiological studies have been negative or inconclusive concerning a possible causal link 
between Agent Orange and the illnesses of the Vietnam veterans. Id. at 1232-34. 
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base their experts' argument that Agent Orange caused the plain-
tiffs' diseases. l58 Furthermore, although one of the plaintiffs' experts 
submitted affidavits that included the results of T-cell studies per-
formed on the plaintiffs, he did not conclusively state that Agent 
Orange more likely than not caused the plaintiffs' illnesses. 159 The 
court noted that if the plaintiffs' experts could not state that the T-
cell studies showed that Agent Orange more likely than not caused 
their illnesses, the plaintiffs could not prove causation. 160 
The In re Agent Orange court concluded that the plaintiffs failed 
to show causation for three major reasons. 161 First, their experts' 
conclusions did not consider the epidemiological studies that showed 
no causation. 162 Secondly, according to the court, the unidentified 
studies of animals and industrial workers upon which the plaintiffs' 
experts relied were not relevant. l63 Finally, the experts did not 
carefully analyze other possibilities of causation. 164 
The preceding cases show that more courts are using epidemio-
logical studies to determine if the causation element has been met 
to prove a toxic tort. l65 Even with expert testimony concerning the 
individual plaintiff's illness, plaintiffs may now need a valid epide-
miological study to indicate that exposure to a certain chemical will 
probably result in a rise in the incidence of the illness. 166 
V. THE USE OF PARTICULARISTIC EVIDENCE TO PROVE 
CAUSATION IN TOXIC TORTS 
Particularistic evidence of causation provides a court with direct 
evidence of the cause of a particular plaintiff's injury.167 Particular-
istic evidence is the only evidence that can specifically analyze the 
relation between a particular exposure and a particular plaintiff. 168 
Consequently, courts have historically relied on this kind of evidence 
to prove causation. 169 
158 Id. at 1234. 
159Id. at 1237. 
160 See id. at 1238. 
161 I d. at 1250. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. 
165 See supra notes 149-64 and accompanying text. 
166 See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange," 611 F. Supp. at 1238. 
167 See generally Callahan, supra note 1, at 619. 
168 See id. 
169 See Wells v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 788 F.2d 741, 744 (11th Cir.), eert. denied, 479 
U.S. 950 (1986); Ferebee v. Chevron Chern. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1535 (D.C. Cir.), eert. denied, 
469 U.S. 1062 (1984) (epidemiological evidence is not required for proof of causation). 
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A. The Origins of Particularistic Evidence 
Particularistic evidence of causation most commonly takes the 
form of expert testimony by a physician who personally has exam-
ined the patient. 170 As a basis for his or her conclusion, the physician 
most likely has performed clinical tests gauging the patient's 
health. 171 The purpose of the testimony is then for the medical expert 
to state his or her determination that the cause of the plaintiff's 
injury is the defendant's conduct. l72 To meet the standard of legal 
causation, the expert must testify to a reasonable degree of medical 
certainty that the defendant's conduct caused the plaintiff's injury. 173 
Thus, the importance of particularistic evidence is that it provides 
a court with causal evidence concerning a specific plaintiff.174 In fact, 
some courts demand particularistic evidence in order for a plaintiff 
to meet the demands of the "strong" version of the preponderance 
rule. 175 Indeed, other kinds of evidence-in vivo studies, in vitro 
studies, case reports, and epidemiological evidence--cannot address 
the cause of any specific plaintiff's injury.176 
Particularistic evidence, however, does have significant limits in 
the context of toxic tort cases. l77 There is usually a long latency 
period between an exposure and the manifestation of a disease. 178 
Moreover, the etiology of many diseases is still unknown,179 and 
physicians usually are unable to differentiate between when a disease 
is caused by toxic exposure and when the same disease is caused by 
another factor. ISO 
170 Callahan, supra note 1, at 619. 
171 See Levin & Byers, supra note 15, at 673-75. 
172 See Callahan, supra note 1, at 619. 
173 Id. 
174Id. at 608, 639. Callahan contends that there are two prongs of the causation analysis. 
Id. at 608. The first prong is the determination that the defendant's behavior did or did not 
put the plaintiff at risk of incurring an injury. Id. The second prong is the occurrence 
determination, which assumes that the defendant did put the plaintiff at risk but then analyzes 
whether the defendant did in fact cause the plaintiff's injury. Id. Callahan argues that 
particularistic evidence is the only evidence that goes to proving the occurrence prong of the 
causation analysis. Id. at 608, 639. 
175 See Callahan, supra note 1, at 610-11, citing, In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 
611 F. Supp. 1223, 1261 (E.D.N. Y. 1985), aff'd, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987); Devel~nts, 
supra note 42, at 1619. 
176 See generally Callahan, supra note 1, at 639; Dangel, supra note 5, at 174-78. In vivo 
studies evaluate the result of exposing animals to different doses of a toxin. Id. at 175. In 
vitro studies examine the result of exposing individual animal cells to a toxin. Id. 
177 Callahan, supra note 1, at 630-40. 
178 Wong, supra note 111, at 85. 
179Id. 
180 Id.; Steve Gold, Causation in Toxic Torts: Burdens of Proof, Standards of Persuasion, 
and Statistical Evidence, 96 YALE L.J. 376, 376-77 (1986). 
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Furthermore, expert testimony regarding particularistic evidence 
must meet the standards of FRE 403, 702, and 703. 181 Under FRE 
702, the testimony must be in the area of the expert's qualifications, 
and must aid the court or jury in comprehending the evidence. 182 If 
the expert is qualified to give testimony that would help the court, 
the expert also must meet the provision of FRE 703 requiring a 
reasonable scientific foundation for the expert's opinion. l83 FRE 403 
demands that the expert testimony not be greatly outweighed by 
prejudice, confusion, or deception of the jurors. l84 In a toxic tort 
case, even when an expert can give testimony that meets the FRE 
requirements, an expert cannot give causation testimony completely 
free of any doubt. 185 
B. The Courts' Analysis of Particularistic Evidence 
Some courts have reasoned that because statistical evidence will 
never meet the legal causation standard, it does not warrant serious 
considersation. 186 These courts have relied upon particularistic evi-
dence regarding the plaintiff, no matter how weak, in favor of evi-
dence that can only establish a probability of causation. 187 
In Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical CO.,l88 the trial court awarded 
the Ferebee family $60,000 for the wrongful death of the plaintiff, 
who had been exposed to the Chevron herbicide paraquat while he 
was working at an agricultural center.189 The plaintiff's job was to 
spray the herbicide which came into contact with his skin on several 
occasions. l90 Several months after the first exposure, the plaintiff 
developed pulmonary fibrosis and died. 191 At trial, the plaintiff's 
family presented the expert testimony of two pulmonary specialists 
who had examined the plaintiff.192 They concluded that paraquat 
poisoning was the cause of the plaintiff's injury. 193 
181 See Callahan, supra note 1, at 631. 
182 [d.; FED. R. EVID. 702. 
183 FED. R. EVID. 703; Callahan, supra note 1, at 632-33. 
184 FED. R. EVID. 403; Callahan, supra note 1, at 633. 
185 See generally Callahan, supra note 1, at 639. 
186 See Wells v. Ortho Phannaceutical Corp., 788 F.2d 741,744 (11th Cir.), em. denied, 479 
U.S. 950 (1986). 
187 See id. at 745; Ferebee v. Chevron Chern. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1535--36 (D.C. Cir.), een. 
denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984). 
188 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir.), em. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984). 
189 [d. at 1529, 1531--32. 
100 [d. at 1532. 
191 [d. at 1533. 
192 [d. at 1535. 
193 [d. 
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The defendants appealed the case to the the United States Circuit 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. 194 The appellate court 
held that the plaintiffs did not need to establish cause through epi-
demiological evidence or animal studies because testimony by the 
two expert witnesses was legally sufficient to show causation. l95 In 
this case, then, particularistic evidence satisfied the causation stan-
dard. l96 
Another case that rejected the need for epidemiological evidence 
to prove causation involved a child with birth defects who brought 
a products liability action against a pharmaceutical company that 
manufactured a spermicide. 197 In Wells v. Ortho Pharmaceutical 
COrp.,198 the trial court awarded the plaintiff over five million 
dollars199 even though the defendants presented epidemiological ev-
idence that no causal association existed between birth defects and 
the spermicide. 200 
Relying on Ferebee, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit affirmed the trial court decision.201 The court rea-
soned that the use of epidemiological evidence to refute a causal 
association between the spermicide and the plaintiff's birth defects 
was not of legal worth as it did not relate to that particular plaintiff 
in that particular case. 202 The court closely examined the plaintiff's 
particularistic evidence, and ignored the defendant's epidemiological 
study showing that no association existed between birth defects and 
the use of spermicides. 203 According to the court, the plaintiff's 
highly qualified expert witnesses established causation more 
strongly than the defendant's epidemiological studies that did not 
concern this specific plaintiff. 204 
Plaintiffs presented T-cell studies as particularistic evidence to 
prove causation in Sterling v. Velsicot Chemical COrp.2M Residents 
who lived near a chemical waste disposal site sued the Velsicol 
194 [d. at 1533. 
195 [d. at 1535. 
196 See id. at 1535-36. 
197 Wells v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 615 F. Supp. 262 (D.C. Ga. 1985), a/I'd, 788 F.2d 
741 (11th Cir.), em. denied, 479 U.S. 950 (1986). 
198 [d. 
199 [d. at 296-98. 
200 [d. at 292. 
201 Wells v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 788 F.2d 741, 745 (11th Cir. 1986). 
202 See id. at 745. 
203 See id. at 744. 
204 See id. at 744-45. 
205 647 F. Supp. 303 (W.D. Tenn. 1986), a/I'd in part and rev'd in part, 855 F.2d 1188 (6th 
Cir. 1988). 
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Chemical Corporation, accusing Velsicol of allowing chemicals that 
the company had dumped to leak into the plaintiffs' drinking water. 206 
The United States District Court for the Western District of Ten-
nessee held that the defendant was strictly liable, negligent, and 
liable in both trespass and nuisance. 2m The court awarded the five 
representative plaintiffs five million dollars and the entire group of 
plaintiffs seven and one half million dollars in punitive damages. 208 
Two immunologists, Dr. Alan S. Levin and Dr. William G. Crook, 
testified for the plaintiffs to prove injury of the plaintiffs' immune 
systems.209 As a result of his studies of the T -cell levels of five specific 
plaintiffs, Dr. Levin concluded that their immune systems were 
permanently and seriously damaged.210 He diagnosed these plaintiffs 
as having "chemically induced immune dysregulation," which only 
develops because of chronic chemical exposure.211 Dr. Levin deter-
mined from his studies that the source of the illnesses was the 
chemical exposure from the Sterling Velsicol Chemical Corpora-
tion. 212 Dr. Crook supported Dr. Levin's statements regarding the 
extent of the damage to the plaintiffs' immune systems.213 Relying 
on the testimony of the plaintiffs' experts, the court found that the 
defendant's expert testimony was "against the preponderance of the 
evidence. "214 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, how-
ever, reversed on the issue of compensatory damages for immune 
dysregulation, reasoning that the plaintiffs' experts did not perform 
the proper clinical tests or examinations on the plaintiffs.215 Fur-
thermore, according to the court, the medical basis216 of their testi-
mony did not comport with FRE 702.217 Although the court admitted 
006 [d. at 306. 
2m [d. at 307. 
208 [d. 
209 [d. at 499. 
210 [d. at 500-01. Dr. Levin determined that all five plaintiffs had a high percentage of T-
cells. [d. 
211 [d. at 502, 505. 
212 See id. at 504-05. 
213 [d. at 505. 
214 [d. at 507. 
21. Sterling v. Velsicol Chern. Corp., 855 F.2d 1188, 1209 (6th Cir. 1988). 
216 [d. at 1208-09 (court contended that prominent medical societies in field of allergy and 
immunology reject clinical ecology, which was medical basis of Dr. Crook's and Dr. Levin's 
testimony). 
217 [d. the Sixth Circuit applied a four-pronged test to determine whether the testimony is 
admissible under FRE 702. The expert must be 1) a qualified expert, 2) testifying on an 
appropriate topic, 3) that coincides with a generally accepted theory, and 4) the probativeness 
of the testimony must outweigh any prejudicial effect. [d. at 1208. 
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that numerous medical associations, including the American Medical 
Association, have not repudiated clinical ecology, the court de-
manded a more traditional methodology.218 Thus, because the Sixth 
Circuit would not accept the validity of T-cell tests nor the meth-
odology of clinical ecology, the plaintiffs lost on their immune dys-
regulation claims.219 
Not all courts have considered T-cell studies unable to meet the 
requirements of FRE 702. In Elam v. Alcolac, Inc.,22o the United 
States District Court for the Western District of Missouri found that 
T-cell studies can show the effects of chemical exposure on the 
immune system.221 Thus, the E lam court is an example of a court 
that has accepted the science of clinical ecology, carefully weighed 
the probativeness of T-cell studies, and accepted the T-cell study 
results as determining causation.222 To prove the strong version of 
the preponderance rule, courts require particularistic evidence, 
which in the case of Elam, the evidence was T-cell studies. 223 
VI. THE USE OF BOTH EPIDEMIOLOGICAL AND PARTICULARISTIC 
EVIDENCE TO PROVE CAUSATION IN TOXIC TORTS 
Although some courts have criticized the limits of either epide-
miological or particularistic evidence, other courts rely on both to 
prove the strong version of the preponderance rule, or in other 
words, traditional causation. 224 Even in early toxic tort cases, courts 
acknowledged the importance of the combination of partiCUlaristic 
and epidemiological evidence to prove causation. 225 
In Allen v. United States,226 the plaintiffs sued the United States 
government under the Federal Tort Claims Act to obtain damages 
for cancer incidence resulting from nuclear bomb testing between 
1951 and 1963.227 The plaintiffs alleged that the radioactive fallout 
from the testing drifted into their communities and caused them to 
develop cancers including leukemia. 228 Noting the long latency period 
218 See id. at 1209. 
219 See id. 
220 765 S.W.2d 42, 184-85 (Mo. App. 1988), eert. denied, 493 U.S. 817 (1989). 
221 [d. 
= See, e.g., id. 
223 See generally id. 
224 Developments, supra note 42, at 1619. 
225 See, e.g., Miller v. Nat'! Cabinet Co., 168 N.E.2d 811,813-14 (N.Y. 1960). 
226 588 F. Supp. 247 (D. Utah 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 816 F.2d 1417 (10th Cir. 1987), 
eert. denied, 484 U.S. 1004 (1988). 
227 [d. at 247. 
228 [d. at 252-58. 
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and the unknown etiology of cancer, the United States District Court 
for the District of Utah acknowledged the difficulties the plaintiffs 
had in proving legal causation. 229 
The court found, however, that the plaintiffs' evidence showed a 
causal connection between the defendant's conduct and their inju-
ries.230 Applying the substantial factor test of causation,231 the court 
held that the plaintiffs had established causation by presenting an 
extensive amount of evidence relating the defendant's conduct to the 
plaintiffs' injury.232 In reaching its conclusion, the court considered 
particularistic factors such as the fact that the injury, cancer, was 
consistent with the type of exposure the plaintiffs experienced; the 
proximity of the plaintiffs to the test site; the extent of their expo-
sure; and the existence of a latency period that was consistent with 
radiation etiology. 233 
The Allen court also considered probabilistic factors, such as the 
probability that the plaintiffs were exposed to radiation and whether 
the incidence of injury in the community was statistically above the 
norm.234 Although it admitted that statistical evidence, or epidemi-
ological evidence, is the strongest evidence for proving causation in 
toxic torts,235 the Allen court rejected the concept of a 5% limit of 
chance as a threshold value and other technical rules of statistical 
significance.236 Consequently, the court relied on all evidence that 
was persuasive, not just epidemiological evidence, in concluding that 
the United States government was responsible for the plaintiffs' 
injuries.237 The court allocated damages to those plaintiffs who pro-
vided both strong statistical evidence of a causal connection and 
positive expert testimony regarding that specific plaintiff's injury. 238 
In a more recent case, Elam v. Alcolac, Inc. ,239 the plaintiffs also 
used both epidemiological and particularistic evidence to prove cau-
229 [d. at 405-06. 
230 [d. at 406. 
231 [d. at 411; see supra notes 51--53 and accompanying text. 
232 See id. at 425. 
233 [d. at 415. 
234 [d. 
235 See id. at 416. 
235 [d. at 418. Statistical tests of significance are very high for the researcher to meet. [d. 
at 416. For a research result to be "statistically significant," the probability that the result is 
because of chance must not be more than five percent. [d. (citing H. YOUNG, STATISTICAL 
TREATMENT OF EXPERIMENTAL DATA 131-32 (1962». 
237 [d. 
238 See id. at 437-43. 
239 765 S.W.2d 42 (Mo. App. 1988), eert. denied, 493 U.S. 817 (1989). 
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sation. 240 In E lam, residents of Sedalia, Missouri, sued Alcolac, Inc., 
the owner of a chemical plant that had spilled chemicals including 
epidchlorohydrin, toluene, and allyl alcohol. 241 The trial court jury 
decided the issues of lowered market value of property which 
sounded in nuisance, and personal injury negligence.242 The jury 
awarded each plaintiff two hundred thousand dollars for personal 
injury and over 1.3 million dollars for punitive damages.243 The trial 
court denied the defendant's motion for a judgment not withstanding 
the verdict, but granted a new trial as to the issue of damages. 244 
Consequently, the plaintiffs appealed the court's order to set aside 
the damage awards and the grant for a new trial. 245 
The Missouri Court of Appeals held that the plaintiffs' evidence 
was sufficient for the jury to determine that the toxic spills caused 
the residents' injuries, and that the compensation damages were 
valid. 246 Because of the improper admission of evidence regarding 
"chemically induced acquired immune deficiency syndrome" (AIDS), 
the Elam court demanded a new trial on the issue of punitive dam-
ages. 247 
In reviewing the case, the Elam court had applied the substantial 
factor test to determine causation.248 To prove causation, the plain-
tiffs offered both particularistic and epidemiological evidence.249 To 
provide particularistic evidence, the plaintiffs retained Dr. Car-
now.250 Dr. Carnow performed a patient evaluation of symptoms, 
laboratory tests, and medical history interviews on each of the plain-
tiffs.251 In addition, Dr. Arthur C. Zahalsky performed T-cell studies 
240 See id. 180-85. 
241 [d. at 49, 72. 
242 [d. at 49. 
243 [d. The award for the nuisance claims varied for the different plaintiffs. [d. 
244 [d. 
245 [d. 
246 See id. at 189-97, 222. 
247 See id. at 213-14. 
248 [d. at 173-74. The source of the substantial factor test, is the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 432 (2). According to the Restatement, "[iJf two forces are actively operating, one 
because of the actor's negligence, the other not because of any misconduct on his part, and 
each of itself is sufficient to bring about harm to another, the actor's negligence may be found 
to be a substantial factor in bringing it about." [d. at 174. 
249 [d. at 73. 
250 See id. at 89. To prove cause-in-fact, Dr. Carnow had to prove all elments of an external 
cause: a related external event, exposure of the plaintiffs to the event, effect from exposure, 
relationship of the effect to the external event, evidence that others had been similarly exposed 
and similarly harmed, and laboratory results that were expected. [d. 
251 [d. at 91. 
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of the plaintiffs.252 According to Dr. Zahalsky's testimony, the results 
of his studies showed that all of the plaintiffs' immune systems were 
fighting against chronic exposure to toxins.253 A different laboratory 
also performed T-cell studies on twenty-four of the plaintiffs and 
discovered that nineteen of them had an immune dysfunction, which 
Dr. Zahalsky believed to be overwhelmingly statistically signifi-
cant. 254 As a result of his findings, Dr. Zahalsky diagnosed all thirty-
one plaintiffs with "systemic, progressive chemical intoxication. "255 
Dr. Carnow confirmed this diagnosis. 256 For each of the plaintiffs, 
Dr. Zahalsky also tested aT-cell antibody, which led him to conclude 
that ten plaintiffs had chemically induced AIDS.257 Further, because 
the immunological problems have been progressive, the other plain-
tiffs that only have moderate immune dysregulation eventually will 
acquire AIDS.258 
To show a relationship between exposure to the defendant's chem-
icals and the plaintiffs' injuries-or in other words, biological cau-
sation-the plaintiffs' experts presented epidemiological evidence.259 
A toxicologist for the plaintiffs presented epidemiological and animal 
studies showing a correlation between exposure to epichlorihydrin 
and cancer, chromosomal damage, and immune damage. 26o As an 
epidemiologist and environmental medicine specialist,261 Dr. Carnow 
252 Id. at 84. Dr. Zahalsky testified that immune dysfunction means that because of chemical 
exposure or some other antigen attack, one's immune system becomes less protective against 
foreign agents that enter the body and a harmful substance that does enter the system may 
escape attack and damage the system further. Id. at 83. 
263 Id. Dr. Carnow testified on the importance of B-cells and T-cells in the immune system. 
Id. T-cells "search and destroy" antigens in the body, remember prior attacks by antigens, 
live long, and can expand. Id. Because of the plaintiffs' T-cell irregularities, Dr. Carnow 
concluded that the T-cell study results were consistent with persistent exposure to the 
Alcolac's toxins. Id. at 90-100. 
254 Id. at 85. Specifically, Dr. Zahalsky tested for the number of total lymphocytes (T-cells 
and B-cells), the speed of the T-cells when attacked, the number of each different kind of T-
cells, and the ratios of the different kind of T-cells. Id. at 99. 
255 Id. at 86. Even the Alcolac experts acknowledged that immune dysregulation may result 
from exposure to the Alcolac chemicals. Id. at 99. 
256 Id. at 100-01. 
257 Id. at 85. By testing the T-cell antibody, HNK-l, Dr. Zahalsky could determine whether 
there was an abnormal ratio of helper and suppressor cells: an indication of chemically induced 
AIDS.ld. 
258 Id. 
259Id. at 73-74. The court stated that to show biological causation, a plaintiff must offer 
epidemiological, toxicological, or pharmacological evidence. I d. at 185. Statistically significant 
studies are solid circumstantial evidence. Id. at 185-87. 
260 I d. at 73. 
261 Id. at 91. 
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confirmed these findings. 262 Even an expert for Alcolac admitted that 
studies have shown exposure to epichlorohydrin creates a higher 
risk of cancer and may damage the immune system. 263 
Consequently, the defendants did not attempt to prove that the 
chemicals could not cause injuries similar to those of the plaintiffs. 264 
Alcolac did contend, however, that the plaintiffs could not prove that 
they were in fact exposed to the chemicals, or that chronic systemic 
chemical intoxication was a valid diagnosis of their condition. 265 Be-
cause the plaintiffs testified to seeing the toxins and Dr. Carnow 
testified that Alcolac's spills could be the only possible cause of their 
injuries, however, the Elam court held that such evidence was suf-
ficient to prove cause-in-fact.266 The court also recognized chronic 
systemic chemical intoxication as a valid medical diagnosis. 267 Thus, 
the court relied on both epidemiological evidence as well as parti-
cularistic expert testimony to reach its result. 268 
Although it never came to a final verdict, a case in which the 
plaintiffs performed their own epidemiological study and extensively 
used T-cell studies was Anderson v. W.R. Grace & CO.269 Several 
children in Woburn, Massachusetts, contracted leukemia during the 
1970s.270 The residents of Woburn later discovered that the city wells 
were contaminated with the carcinogens, trichlorethylene (TCE) and 
tetrachloroethylene (PCE).271 Consequently, plaintiffs sued W.R. 
Grace and Beatrice Foods for wrongful death and pain and suffering 
for the deaths of family members; emotional distress for witnessing 
the deaths of family members or for suffering from illnesses them-
selves; compensation for various illnesses; and increased risk of de-
veloping future illness. 272 In the months of preparation before trial, 
the plaintiffs' investigations disclosed a great amount of dumping 
262 [d. at 73. 
263 See id. at 74. Alcolac also possessed a material safety data sheet indicating that a recent 
epidemiological study was "highly suggestive" that exposure to epichlorhydrin increases the 
risk of cancer. [d. 
264 [d. at 185. 
265 [d. at 180, 189. 
266 See id. at 180-85. 
267 [d. at 189-90. 
268 See id. 73-74, 86. 
269 628 F. Supp. 1219 (D. Mass. 1986), a/I'd sub nom. Anderson v. Beatrice Foods, Co. (1st 
Cir. Mass.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 233 (1990). 
270 Jan Schlictmann, Eight Families Sue W.R. Grace and Beatrice Foods/or Poisoning City 
Wells with Solvents and Causing Leukemia, Disease, and Death, 341 PRAC. L. INST. 1 (1987). 
271 [d. at 1. 
272 Anderson, 628 F. Supp. at 1222. 
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near the water wells by Beatrice Corporation, W. R. Grace, and the 
U nifirst Corporation.273 U nifirst and the plaintiffs, however, soon 
reached a settlement for one million dollars.274 
In order to understand the extent of the damage the toxins al-
legedly caused to each of the plaintiffs, the plaintiffs retained Dr. 
Alan S. Levin. 275 Dr. Levin conducted T-cell studies, both of the 
plaintiffs and their families, that calculated the absolute numbers 
and ratios of T -cells. 276 In his affidavit, Dr. Levin evaluated the 
medical histories and test results of individual family members, 
which indicated that the subjects had been fighting an unrelenting 
carcinogen. 277 He explained that the carcinogens present in Woburn's 
well system could cause this harm to the plaintiffs' immune sys-
tems. 278 Consequently, in a weakened state, the immune system 
cannot fight the carcinogens that are constantly assaulting the 
body. 279 
Regarding epidemiological evidence of causation, the Harvard 
School of Public Health and the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) 
completed an epidemiological health study of the children in the 
area. 280 The study found a strong link between childhood illnesses, 
including leukemia, and the children's use of the contaminated wells 
in Woburn.281 Thus, the Harvard Health Study bolstered Dr. Levin's 
conclusions that a causal link existed between the defendants' chem-
icals and the plaintiffs' injuries. 282 
The defendants, however, moved for summary judgment, claiming 
that the statute of limitations barred three of plaintiffs' wrongful 
273 See Schlictmann, supra note 270, at 8. 
274 [d. 
275 See id. at 2--3. 
276 [d. 
277 [d. at 5, 47. The test results indicated highly irregular T-cell levels. [d. at 5. Dr. Levin 
indicated in his supplementary affidavit that the plaintiffs who survived exposure to the toxins 
now suffer from damage to their central nervous, cardiac, respiratory, and immunological 
systems. [d. at 47. Symptoms of these problems include, chronic headaches, infections, aller-
gies, rashes, arthritis, gastro-intestinal tract disorders, genito-urinary tract disorders, neuro-
psychiatric problems, and an increased likelihood for disease. [d. 
278 See id. at 5, 43, 46. Dr. Levin explained, from his own experience with patients and 
significant research in the area of immunology, that TeE and peE, as holgenated hydrocar-
bons, have been shown to cause harm to the immune system, including immune dysregulation 
and inducement of cancer. [d. at 43. His supplementary affidavit further explained that TeE 
and peE, through the process of alkylation, alter DNA and make the protein involved in 
DNA structuring immunogenic. [d. at 46. 
279 [d. at 5. 
280 [d.; S.W. Lagakos et aI., An Analysis of Contaminated Well Water and Health Effects 
in Woburn, Massachusetts, J. OF THE AMER. STAT. Assoc. 583, 583 (1986). 
281 Lagakos, supra note 280, at 587-88. 
282 See generally Schlictmann, supra note 270 at 4, 43-47. 
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death claims, and that the plaintiffs' claims based on emotional dis-
tress and increased risk of cancer were insufficient. 283 The Massa-
chusetts statute of limitations bars wrongful death claims if death 
occurs more than two years after injury.284 The United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Massachusetts held that continued 
exposure to carcinogens, even after the onset of disease, indicated 
further injury.285 The Anderson court reasoned that Dr. Levin's 
evidence regarding T-cell studies proved that the decedents' contin-
uous exposure to toxins from the well water even after the diagnosis 
of their leukemia caused further injury quickening the deaths of 
James Anderson and Carl Robbins, children of family members suing 
for wrongful death.286 In other words, the later, continuous exposure 
was the cause of death. 287 Therefore, because James Anderson's last 
exposure to the defendants' chemicals was within two years of his 
death, his family could recover, however Carl Robbins's family could 
not recover because Carl's last exposure was not within two years 
of his death. 288 
W.R. Grace and Beatrice Foods also argued in the same summary 
judgment motion that the nonleukemic plaintiffs did not have a cause 
of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress because they 
could not prove that they suffered a physical injury.289 The defen-
dants argued that T-cell studies are not "objective symptomatology" 
of harm, as the Massachussetts Supreme Judicial Court requires. 290 
The Anderson court, however, disagreed and held that the nonleu-
kemic plaintiffs did have a cause of action for emotional distress. 291 
Relying on Dr. Levin's testimony that the plaintiffs had suffered T-
cell damage, the court concluded that these plaintiffs did suffer a 
physical injury to their immune systems. 292 Furthermore, according 
to the court, there had been no ruling by the Supreme Judicial Court 
that the physical harm should be easily detectable as compared to 
subcellular. 293 Thus, the court held that T-cell damage could prove 
283 Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1219, 1222 (D. Mass. 1986), afI'd sub nom., 
Anderson v. Beatrice Foods Co., 900 F.2d (1st Cir. Mass.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 233 (1990). 
284 [d. at 1225 (citing M.G.L. CH. 229 § 2). 
285 [d. at 1225. 
286 See id. 
287 [d. 
288 [d. at 1226. 
289 [d. 
290 [d. Objective symptomatology is evidence of physical harm that can be supported by 
expert medical testimony. See id. at 1226-27. 
291 [d. 
292 [d. 
293 [d. at 1226-27. 
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the physical injury requirement of negligent infliction of emotional 
distress. 294 
Another important issue in the defendants' summary judgment 
motion was whether a claim for increased risk of future illness ex-
isted. 295 The court delayed action on this count, explaining that the 
plaintiffs could not recover until they showed that certain diseases 
traditionally resulted from the health problems they presently had. 296 
According to the court, the plaintiffs had to prove that there was a 
"reasonable probability" that the diseases would occur. 297 
In the first phase of the trial, the court entered judgment in favor 
of Beatrice.298 The Anderson court found W.R. Grace liable in neg-
ligence for contaminating the wells.299 Consequently, W.R. Grace 
settled with the plaintiffs for eight million dollars.3°O Although there 
was never a complete trial, the court's summary judgment holding 
shows the court's willingness to examine the value of T-cell studies 
in proving causation.301 Supplemented by physicians' examination of 
the plaintiffs and the Harvard epidemiological studies, T-cell studies 
could have established causation for the plaintiffs' injuries and emo-
tional distress. 
Some courts require plaintiffs to meet the demands of the strong 
version of the preponderance rule in order to gain compensation. 302 
In Allen, the plaintiffs presented both particularistic and epidemio-
logical evidence.303 The court accepted this evidence, realizing its 
limits, but understanding its importance for showing causation.304 In 
Elam, because of the strength of the plaintiffs' particularistic and 
epidemiological evidence regarding causation, the defendants did not 
even contest causation.305 The evidence helped to establish chronic 
systemic intoxication as a recoverable injury.306 Finally, Anderson 
294 [d. 
295 See id. at 1230. 
296 [d. at 1230~2. 
297 [d. at 1231. 
296 See Schlictmann, supra note 270, at 9. 
299 [d. at 10. 
300 [d. 
301 See generally Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., 628 F. Supp. at 1219, 1225-27 (D. Mass. 
1986), af!'d sub nom., Anderson v. Beatrice Foods Co., 900 F.2d 388 (1st Cir. Mass.), eert. 
denied, 111 S. Ct. 233 (1990). 
302 See, e.g., Allen v. United States, 588 F. Supp. 247, 415 (D. Utah 1984), rev'd on other 
grounds, 816 F.2d 1417 (10th Cir. 1987), em. denied, 484 U.S. 1004 (1988). 
303 [d. at 406, 415. 
304 See id. 
305 See Elam v. Alcolac, Inc., 765 S.W. 2d 42, 185 (Mo. App. 1988), eert. denied, 493 U.S. 
817 (1989). 
300 See id. at 180-90. 
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demonstrates a court's willingness to accept T-cell studies bolstered 
by strong epidemiological evidence.307 In all three cases, defendants 
were found liable or failed to win a summary judgment motion 
because of the strength of the plaintiffs' epidemiological and parti-
cularistic evidence. 308 
VII. THE VALUE OF T-CELL STUDIES IN MODERN-DAY TOXIC 
TORT LITIGATION 
The legal standard for causation in toxic tort cases is far from 
settled. 309 Particularistic evidence of causation is usually difficult to 
establish because of the nature of toxic tort injury.310 Furthermore, 
scientific and statistical evidence will never meet all the demands of 
the legal causation standard. 311 Consequently, courts have struggled 
to decide what kind of evidence is relevant in proving causation in 
toxic tort cases. 312 Confusion regarding the standard of causation 
and the intricacies of scientific evidence, however, have brought 
about inconsistencies among courts' decisions. 313 
Some courts demand particularistic evidence,314 some courts de-
mand epidemiological evidence,315 and some courts demand both.316 
Courts that use the strong version of the preponderance rule, which 
requires both particularistic and epidemiological evidence to deter-
mine causation, understand that each type of evidence overcomes 
some of the other's limitations. 317 Because T-cell studies can be the 
basis for both an epidemiological study and a particularistic test, 
such studies can thus satisfy the strong version of the preponderance 
rule. If scientists, immunologists, and litigants develop the potential 
of T-cell studies, these studies can become a more prevalent form of 
proof in toxic tort cases. 
307 See Schlictmann, supra note 270, at 4--5. 
308 See id.; Allen, 588 F. Supp. at 415; Elam; 765 S.W. 2d at 180-85. 
309 See supra notes 27-62 and accompanying text. 
310 See supra notes 170-85 and accompanying text. 
311 See supra notes 11~5 and accompanying text. 
312 See supra notes 146-66, 186-808 and accompanying text. 
313 Compare In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig, 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1239 (E.D.N.Y. 
1985), aff'd 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987) (court reasoned that epidemiological evidence is of 
"critical importance" in proving causation) with Ferebee v. Chevron Chern. Co., 736 F.2d 
1529, 1535 (D.C. Cir.), eert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984) (epidemiological evidence is not 
required for proof of causation). 
314 See supra notes 186-223 and accompanying text. 
315 See supra notes 146-66 and accompanying text. 
316 See supra notes 226-808 and accompanying text. 
317 See generally id. 
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A. The Limits and Potential of T-Cell Studies 
The methodology from which T-cell studies developed, clinical 
ecology, is still a much disputed area of science.318 The study of MCS 
in clinical ecology has resisted a standard definition, theory of etiol-
ogy, symptomatology, diagnosis, and treatment. 319 An undisputed 
fact, however, is that chemicals in the environment are causing 
damage to humans-what we do not know is to what extent. 320 
Because clinical ecology is still in its formative stages, it is worthy 
of study and research, in order to understand the significance and 
etiology of MCS. 
B. The Use of T-Cell Studies as Epidemiological Evidence 
Because some courts rely on epidemiological evidence for proof of 
causation,321 plaintiffs and defendants should be able to offer epide-
miological evidence to show that there is or is not a link between 
exposure to the defendant's chemical and the plaintiff's injury. Even 
when plaintiffs offer particlularistic evidence that they have an in-
jury, and that they were exposed to the defendant's chemical, courts 
often require evidence of a known biological relationship between 
the kind of exposure and the kind of injury that the plaintiff has.322 
Therefore, epidemiological studies of T -cell levels in a population are 
a way of relating chemical exposure to immune damage or other 
injuries that result from immune damage. 
For example, if a plaintiff wanted compensation for immune dys-
regulation, the plaintiff could present epidemiological studies that 
show a positive correlation between exposure to the defendant's 
chemical and chemically induced immune dysregulation. Few epi-
demiologists have conducted T-cell epidemiological studies to show 
a correlation between toxin exposure and injury.323 One study that 
researchers have conducted, however, is an epidemiological study 
318 See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text. 
319 See Terr, supra note 81, at 684-93; Stephen Mooser, The Epidemiology of Multiple 
Chemical Sensitivities, 2 OCCUPATIONAL MED. 663, 664 (1987). 
320 See generally Mooser, supra note 319, at 663; Cullen, supra note 83, at 655-56. 
321 See In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 758 F. Supp. 199, 203 (S.D.N. Y. 1991), 
rev'd, 964 F.2d 92, 97 (2d Cir.); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611, F. Supp. 1223, 
1239 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), afi'd, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987). 
322 See In re "Agent Orange", 611 F. Supp. at 1231-34; Elam v. Alcolac, Inc., 765 S.W.2d 
42, 185 (Mo. App. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 817 (1989). 
323 See Terr, supra, note 81, at 689, 692. 
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determining the risk of acquiring asthma from formaldehyde expo-
sure. 324 
Because T-cell damage can range from slight immune dysregula-
tion to chemically induced AIDS, T-cell epidemiological studies may 
have the advantage, over epidemiological studies of a specific disease 
incidence, by showing distinct dose-response relationships.325 A 
study of specific disease incidence does not show a variance in re-
sponse. 326 For example, a person has cancer or does not have can-
cer.327 The frequency of disease incidence determines dose-re-
sponse. 328 Therefore, to show a significant dose-response relationship 
in an epidemiological study of cancer incidence, an epidemiologist 
must use a very large exposure group covering a wide range of 
exposures.329 Although an epidemiological study of T-cell response 
also would require a variance of exposure levels, a valid study would 
not require a huge study population. For an epidemiological study 
of T-cell damage, the dose-response measurement would be the cor-
relation between the variance in the exposure level to the variance 
in the T-cell damage; not a correlation between the variance in the 
exposure level and the number of a yes or no disease incidence. 
In many toxic tort cases, courts demand epidemiological evidence 
because particularistic evidence of causation is minimal. 330 As a basis 
for an epidemiological study, T-cell studies can show an existing 
relationship or lack of relationship between a chemical and an injury, 
and also demonstrate a dose-response relationship between an ex-
posure level and a kind of injury. In future toxic tort cases, however, 
plaintiffs and defendants could provide, in addition to epidemiological 
studies, particularistic evidence of their T-cell health. 
C. The Use of T-Cell Studies as Particularistic Evidence 
In the past, when plaintiffs using T-cell evidence have lost their 
cases, courts have claimed that T-cell studies have failed to overcome 
324 H. Pross et al., Immunologic Studies of Subjects with Asthma Exposed to Formaldehyde 
and Urea-Formaldehyde Foam Insulation (UFFI) Off Products, 79 J. OF ALLERGY & CLIN-
ICAL IMMUNOLOGY 797 (1987). 
325 Interview with Dr. Dean Hashimoto, Asst. Professor, Boston College Law School (Mar. 
15, 1992). 
326 See HENNEKENS & BURING, supra note 109, at 43. 
327 See generally id. 
328 Id. 
329 See id. 
330 See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1239, 1243 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), 
aft'd, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987). 
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the· weight of epidemiological studies.331 This conclusion is ironic 
because a plaintiff can only prove legal causation by showing that a 
particular chemical more likely than not caused his or her particUlar 
injury332---epidemiological studies can never show causation for a 
specific individual. 333 An examination of an individual's immune sys-
tem, however, can at least show that an extended exposure to a 
chemical harmed the individual. 334 This is an advantage that T-cell 
studies have over other kinds of studies, including, in vivo studies, 
in vitro studies, case reports, and epidemiological studies. 335 Fur-
thermore, if a plaintiff can eliminate the possibility that a source 
other than the defendant's chemical caused the plaintiff's harm, then 
the plaintiff can prove that the only identifiable chemical to cause 
his or her injury must have been the defendant's chemical. 336 
Although some courts have contended that most medical societies 
do not accept the value of clinical ecology, which T-cell studies are 
derived from,337 T -cells are undisputably an essential part of the 
immune system.338 The immune system protects our bodies from 
disease339 and T -cells are an important mechanism in initiating an 
immune response,340 attacking antigens,341 and regulating the im-
mune response.342 Tests showing abnormal T-cell ratios and num-
bers, therefore, indicate that an individual's immune system is dam-
aged. 343 
An immunologist can perform a number of T-cell tests to deter-
mine an individual's immune system damage. 344 The results of a 
plaintiff's T-cell tests are then compared to established normal 
ranges of T-cell numbers. 345 From such a comparison, an immunol-
ogist can determine the extent of the T-cell damage that is present. 346 
331 See id. at 1239, 1250, 1263. 
332 Dore, supra note 51, at 434. 
333 Gold, supra note 180, at 379-80. 
334 Levin & Byers, supra note 15, at 674-77. 
335 See Callahan, supra note 1, at 639; Dangel, supra note 7, at 174-78; Brennan, supra 
note 1, at 507. 
336 See Levin & Byers, supra note 15, at 673-76. 
337 See Sterling v. Velsicol Chern. Corp., 647 F. Supp. 303 (W.D. Tenn. 1986), aff'd in part 
and rev'd in part, 855 F.2d 1188, 1208-09 (6th Cir. 1988). 
338 See Marrack & Kappler, supra note 16, at 36, 45. 
339 von Boehmer & Kisielow, supra note 69, at 74. 
340 [d. at 74-76. 
341 [d. 
342 SELL, supra note 65, at 218-20. 
343 See Levin & Byers, supra note 15, at 672. 
344 Levin & Byers, supra note 88, at 8. 
345 [d. 
346 See generally Sterling v. Velsicol Chern. Corp., 647 F. Supp. 303, 500-01 (W.D. Tenn 
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T-cell damage can vary from chemically induced immune dysregu-
lation, chemically induced AIDS, and cancer.347 There is also the 
possibility that present immune dysregulation may get progressively 
worse and lead to chemically induced AIDS or cancer. 348 
Once T-cell test results show an injury to the plaintiff, the next 
step is to determine the possible sources of the damage.349 One way 
is to test the memory cells to show individual causation. 350 Because 
memory cells respond more quickly after a first attack by an antigen, 
scientists can expose a sample of an individual's memory cells to a 
small amount of the toxin and examine the reaction rate of the 
memory cells. 351 If that particular plaintiff has been in contact with 
the toxin before, the memory cells will react rapidly.352 If a plaintiff's 
memory cells show a fast reaction to a suspected injury-causing 
toxin, the reaction is analogous to a fingerprint on the smoking 
gun. 353 
The use of the memory cell test is therefore useful in mitigating 
the indeterminate plaintiff and the indeterminate defendant prob-
lem. 354 The test diminishes the indeterminate plaintiff problem by 
showing that the plaintiff has been exposed to that chemical be-
fore. 355 To lessen the indeterminate defendant problem, an immu-
nologist can test the memory cells with other chemicals.356 If the 
plaintiff's memory cells only react to or react the quickest to the 
defendant's chemical, such a result would indicate that the cause of 
the plaintiff's injury is the defendant's chemical. 357 Not only is this 
evidence useful for a plaintiff, but defendants may also utilize this 
test to show that no injury is present in the plaintiff or that the 
plaintiff was not even exposed to the defendant's chemical. 
The T -cells are thus a potential basis for a test to establish par-
ticularistic evidence of causation for both plaintiffs and defendants. 
Plaintiffs can use this test to show that they were exposed to the 
1986), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 855 F.2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988); Elam v. Alcolac, Inc., 
765 S.W.2d 42,99-100 (Mo. App. 1988), em. denied, 493 U.S. 817 (1989). 
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defendant's chemical and that they were injured. Defendants can 
also use the test to prove the opposite conclusion. Because most 
courts still rely on some form of particularistic evidence and the 
strong version of the preponderance rule requires it, T-cell tests for 
the individual plaintiff are a potential test for scientists, plaintiffs, 
and defendants to develop. 
D. The Integrated Use of T-Cell Epidemiological Studies and 
Individual T-Cell Tests 
Some courts require both epidemiological and particularistic evi-
dence to prove causation. 358 This requirement, referred to as the 
strong version of the preponderance rule demands particularistic 
evidence regarding the specific plaintiff and epidemiological evidence 
relating to proximate cause and the level of risk to which the defen-
dant subjected the plaintiff.359 By providing both kinds of evidence, 
litigants come close to proving or disproving traditional legal cau-
sation. Although scientific evidence will never fully meet the demand 
of traditional legal causation, the use of both epidemiological and 
particularistic evidence allows each kind of evidence to overcome 
some of the limits of the other.360 The development and use of T-cell 
studies as a basis for epidemiological and particularistic evidence 
could provide strong causal evidence for a plaintiff or defendant. 
For example, a plaintiff develops cancer after chronic exposure to 
formaldehyde insulation and sues the manufacturer under a products 
liability claim. An immunogist could analyze epidemiological studies 
that compare formaldehyde exposure and immune system damage. 361 
The immunologist could then testify that a biologic relationship ex-
ists between formaldehyde exposure and immune damage and that 
this immune damage led to cancer.362 Admittedly, not many scientists 
have conducted epidemiological studies comparing a type of exposure 
and T-cell abnormalities. These kind of studies, however, are a po-
tential for the scientific community to research and develop and 
litigants to consider and use. 
Next, an immunologist could perform a T-cell test to determine 
the plaintiff's T-cell absolute numbers and ratios. 363 The immunolo-
358 See supra notes 224--308 and accompanying text. 
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361 See Pross, supra note 324, at 797. In the study, only small, significant immunologic 
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gist could then compare the plaintiff's test results with epidemiolg-
ical studies or established normal T-cell ranges to show immune 
system damage. 364 An immunologist could also perform a mitogen 
challenge test to determine how strongly the plaintiff's immune 
system is working. 365 If the immune system's attack is weak, the 
immune system is damaged. 366 Finally, a memory cell test could 
provide evidence of exposure to formaldehyde, thus eliminating the 
defendant and plaintiff indeterminancy problems. 367 
This example is similar to the evidence that Dr. Levin, the Centers 
for Disease Control (CDC), and the Harvard School of Public Health 
produced for the Woburn plaintiffs in Anderson v. W.R. Grace & 
CO.368 Although a T-cell epidemiological study was not conducted, 
Harvard and the CDC conducted an epidemiological study of child-
hood leukemia incidence in the Woburn area. 369 This evidence com-
plemented Dr. Levin's survey of immune damage in the plaintiffs' 
families. 370 The combined studies showed that PCE and TCE expo-
sure caused immune damage and such immune damage led to leu-
kemia in children.371 Particularistic and epidemiological evidence of 
T-cell damage can therefore lead to further inferences of a causal 
relationship between chemical exposure and diseases other than im-
mune damage. 
Although many experts believe that epidemiological studies are 
the strongest evidence available in proving causation in toxic torts, 
critics and supporters agree that an epidemiological study alone only 
can show the probability that the defendant's chemical caused the 
plaintiff's injury, or the degree of risk that the defendant subjected 
the plaintiff.372 Litigants also must utilize particularistic evidence to 
show that this partiCUlar defendant did or did not cause this partic-
ular plaintiff's injury.373 T-cell studies can accomplish both. 
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Although some courts now allow plaintiffs to prove a weak version 
of the preponderance rule instead of the traditional strong version 
of the preponderance rule,374 courts that accept the validity of T-cell 
studies do not have to replace the strong version of the preponder-
ance rule for a weaker version. T-cell studies can be a means for a 
plaintiff or a defendant to provide a court with both particularistic 
and epidemiological evidence of whether or not causation exists. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Although clinical ecology has been criticized for its lack of foun-
dation in science, it is an area of medicine that requires further 
study. Scientific knowledge has not developed to the extent that one 
can know how exposure to various chemicals affects the human body. 
It does make sense, however, that exposure to deleterious chemicals 
would have an adverse affect on the human immune system. Con-
sequently, the development of T-cell studies is necessary to under-
stand exactly how chemicals can damage the immune system. Once 
this is determined, T-cell studies could provide powerful causal ev-
idence of a chemical's risk to a population and the source of a par-
ticular plaintiff's serious or fatal injury. 
374 See Callahan, supra note 1, at 611. 
